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Abstract
The  aim  of  this  research  is  to  examine  the  role  of  state  ownership  in  corporate 
governance and firm performance. We employed ordinary least squares and two-stage 
least squares regressions to analyze the effects of state ownership on firm performance. 
We go beyond existing research on state ownership by carefully disentangle investment 
objectives  of  state-controlled  financial  institutions.  Such  state  ownership  can  be 
classified as profit-oriented and non-profit-oriented, in which the former consider 
return  on  investment  to  be  the  primary  investment  objective,  whereas  the  latter 
prioritizes socio-economic development. We found that profit-oriented state ownership 
is an effective corporate governance mechanism and provides political patronage to 
the firm in the form of firm’s specific resources and credit financing. Although non-
profit-oriented state ownership firms also receive similar political patronage, they tend 
to be associated with inefficiencies such as the free-rider problems, bureaucracies and 
political intervention in firm management. We conclude that state ownership consists 
of heterogeneous entities with respect to corporate governance and firm performance.
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1. Introduction
Corporate  governance  is  considered  to  be  a  determinant  of  firm  success.  An 
effective corporate governance system plays an important role in reducing agency 
costs and enabling firms to operate with maximum efficiency in production, in 
addition  to  achieving  economies  of  scale  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983).  Efficient 
corporate governance systems can curb unnecessary expenses such as monitoring, 
business restructuring and contract enforcement. Thus, the importance of corporate 
governance has attracted the attention of many academic researchers over the past 
several decades.
Notably, there is a general consensus in the literature suggesting that the presence 
of institutional investors may contribute to effective monitoring in terms of firm 
management (Johnson et al., 1996; Woidtke, 2002; Le et al., 2006; Choi et al., 
2012).  In  emerging  economies,  prior  studies  have  focused  on  the  role  of  state 
ownership  in  corporate  governance  and  firm  performance  to  show  how  state 
ownership differs from conventional institutional investors (Ramírez and Tan, 2004; 
Ang and Ding, 2006; Tian and Estrin, 2008; Saleh et al., 2009). Indeed, there have 
been dozens of such studies devoted to examining the relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance in emerging economies; however, the findings are 
often inconsistent and conflicting. On the one hand, a few studies have reported a 
non-significant relationship between state ownership and firm performance (Saleh 
et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2012). On the other hand, other studies have found positive 
effects of state ownership on firm performance in emerging economies in Asia 
(Ramírez and Tan, 2004; Ang and Ding, 2006; Lau and Tong, 2008; Zunaidah and 
Fauzias, 2008; Ghazali, 2010; Najid and Rahman, 2011). Despite the extensive 
studies  on  state  ownership,  we  find  that  these  studies  typically  begin  with  the 
premise that state ownership produces either a positive or a negative impact on 
firm performance; thus, these studies unanimously assume that state ownership is 
homogeneous and identical from entity to entity. However, the role of institutional 
ownership, including state ownership, may vary when institutional investors have 
different  investment  objectives  and  strategies  (Woidtke,  2002;  Le  et  al.,  2006). 
Specifically,  Choi  et  al.  (2012)  noted  that  more  studies  with  new  theoretical 
perspectives are required to understand the relationship between state ownership 
and firm performance.
In  this  paper,  we  intend  to  examine  the  role  of  state  ownership  in  corporate 
governance and firm performance to shed light on the inconsistent and conflicting 
findings on the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. Our 
study  differs  from  previous  studies  in  the  following  ways.  First,  we  adopt  the 
view that state ownership is not homogenous. Second, we account for the socio-
economic dimension of state ownership. Third, we consider the pros and cons of 
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much to the view that the firm performance and business strategies of contemporary 
organizations  are  influenced  by  institutional  setting  (or  environment)  and  the 
motives of firm owners (Stefanovic et al., 2010; Stefanovic and Milosevic, 2012).
We propose our hypothesis as follows: There are systematic differences among state 
ownership with respect to corporate governance and firm performance. Specifically, 
we contend that state ownership should not be viewed as homogeneous or identical 
across entities in Malaysia. The role of state ownership in corporate governance and 
firm performance also differ from conventional institutional ownership.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 
describes sample, model specification, estimation strategies and measures. Section 
4 reports empirical analysis. Section 5 presents empirical results and discussion. 
Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
In emerging economies, the investment objectives of government-linked financial 
institutions are somewhat different than those of international institutional investors 
(Tam and Tan, 2007). In Malaysia, the types of local institutional investors can 
be further classified into government-linked and non-government-linked financial 
institutions.  Non-government-linked  financial  institutions  include  private  mutual 
funds, pension funds and hedge funds managed by local institutional investors; 
these resemble international institutional investors. Conversely, government-linked 
financial institutions in Malaysia are widely recognized to be controlled by the 
government. Equity ownership in corporate sectors that is held by government-
controlled financial institutions is considered to be state-owned.
Notably,  there  are  two  schools  of  thoughts  on  state  ownership  with  respect  to 
firm performance. The first school of thought reasons that state ownership is not 
an  effective  governance  mechanism  in  Malaysia  for  several  reasons.  First,  the 
ethnic-biased economic policy in Malaysia has created free-rider problems because 
Malay investors are protected under the establishment of the Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (PNB) trust fund (Suto, 2003). Because the Malaysian government views 
state ownership as an instrument through which it may be involved in economic 
activities, state ownership prioritizes socio-economic objectives in the investment 
strategies of financial institutions rather than maximizing firm value. Second, the 
bureaucratic  structure  in  government-controlled  financial  institutions  may  be 
costly because the government per se is the agent of its citizens (Woidtke, 2002; 
Tam and Tan, 2007). Thus, the role of state ownership in corporate governance 
has been questioned because the interests of the agent (the government) do not 
necessarily dovetail with the interests of the citizens. Third, it is a common practice Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state...   
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for the Malaysian government to appoint firm management based on political and 
social objectives (Saleh et al., 2009; Najid and Rahman, 2011). A major problem 
with this type of practice is that management teams and boards of directors may 
not be appointed based on qualifications. Similar arguments also can be detected 
in an European emerging economy. Lahovnik and Malenković (2011) argue that 
the  decline  of  state  ownership  in  the  ownership  structure  leads  to  state-owned 
enterprises to adopt good corporate governance practices in Slovenia. In short, state 
ownership is unlikely to become an effective corporate governance mechanism to 
help monitor firm management.
Whereas the first school of thought focuses on corporate governance, the second 
school of thought alternatively reasons that corporations receive political patronage 
from  state  ownership  in  emerging  economies  with  high  levels  of  government 
intervention. With respect to Malaysia, the government has played a strategic role 
in internal resource configurations to achieve national economic objectives (Öniş, 
1991; Furuoka, 2007; Gomez, 2009). In turn, government intervention has caused 
economic agents (or corporations) to secure protection from market competition. 
Stated differently, economic agents with a close relationship to the government may 
obtain industry-specific resources to outperform competitors in local industry. For 
instance, state ownership in the ownership structure of a firm may provide it with a 
political link to participate in state-led development projects (Zunaidah and Fauzias, 
2008). Consistent with such arguments, Fraser et al. (2006) analyzed the period 
from 1990 to 1999 in Malaysia and discovered that firms with state ownership 
have better access to capital financing. They concluded that political linkage might 
represent investment opportunities for firms, which would, in turn, have a positive 
impact on firm performance.
Voluminous  empirical  studies  have  emerged  that  investigate  the  relationship 
between state ownership and firm performance in emerging economies. However, 
these empirical studies yield conflicting results. On the one hand, several studies 
have found that state ownership does not affect firm performance (Saleh et al., 2009; 
Choi et al., 2012). Specifically, Saleh (2009) found that state ownership does not 
contribute to the performance of intellectual capital in the firms. On the other hand, 
other studies have discovered a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between state ownership and firm performance (Ramírez and Tan, 2004; Ang and 
Ding,  2006;  Lau  and Tong,  2008;  Zunaidah  and  Fauzias,  2008;  Ghazali,  2010; 
Najid and Rahman, 2011). For instance, Ang and Ding (2006) discovered that state 
ownership has a positive relationship with firm performance and concluded that 
state ownership leads to better firm management in Singapore. 
Whereas most of the studies reviewed above suggest that state ownership exerts 
a  positive  influence  on  firm  performance,  the  evidence  is  far  from  conclusive. 
The main contention of our paper is that the conflicting evidence signifies that 
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perspective owes much to the view that there may be heterogeneity in institutional 
ownership because of systematic differences in investment objectives (Woidtke, 
2002;  Le  et  al.,  2006). According  to  Lau  and Tong  (2008),  state  ownership  in 
Malaysia  is  the  sum  of  the  corporate  ownership  held  by  seven  government-
linked  financial  institutions  that  are  controlled  by  the  Malaysian  government. 
Subsequently,  state-controlled  financial  institutions  can  be  classified  as  either 
profit-oriented  or  non-profit-oriented,  depending  on  their  investment  objectives; 
the former consider return on investment to be the primary investment objective, 
whereas the latter prioritizes the achievement of socio-economic development.
Thus far, we have identified two types of state ownership based on their primary 
investment objectives. We propose that profit-oriented state ownership is likely to 
produce a positive influence on firm performance for the following reasons. First, 
profit-oriented state investors are likely to perform professional monitoring of firm 
management regardless of whether their investment horizons are oriented to the 
short or long term. This argument centers on the fact that institutional investors 
are typically professional investors who have the ability and oversight skills to 
monitor  firms.  When  profit-oriented  state  investors  adopt  a  long-term  horizon 
(or  buy-and-hold)  as  an  investment  strategy,  they  have  economic  incentives  to 
assume a monitoring role in corporate governance (Le et al., 2006). However, the 
possibility of profit-oriented state investors adopting short-term (or quick entry-
and-exit) investment strategies raises the question of whether they intend to engage 
in such monitoring activities and whether they will be inclined to liquidate their 
shareholdings to safeguard their investment should the firm’s prospects appear to 
deteriorate. This concern is less relevant in emerging economies such as Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia because a prior study has shown there is high ownership 
concentration in the hands of governments in these countries consistently (Claessens 
and  Fan,  2002).  Additionally,  profit-oriented  state  investors  have  difficulty 
selling their shares in open markets because of low market liquidity in emerging 
economies (Lesmond, 2005). The rationale is that the liquidation of a large number 
of shares typically results in a discount and depresses share prices (Le et al., 2006). 
As a result, profit-oriented state investors are forced to monitor firm management to 
safeguard their investment. Second, profit-oriented state investors have incentives 
to  promote  good  corporate  governance  practices  (e.g.,  board  independence  and 
independent audit committee) because the poor performance of their funds will 
lead to more pressure and monitoring from the contributors (Woidtke, 2002). Stated 
differently,  management  of  profit-oriented  state-controlled  financial  institutions 
functions similar to management of conventional institutional investors in which 
the primary objective is investment returns. Third, state ownership in emerging 
economies with a high degree of state intervention – such as Malaysia – provides 
political patronage to firms in the form of access to capital financing and political 
support to participate in government-directed projects (Fraser et al., 2006; Zunaidah Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state...   
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and Fauzias, 2008). In short, profit-oriented state ownership is likely to exert a 
positive influence on firm performance.
However,  we  expect  that  non-profit  oriented  state  ownership  does  not  have  a 
significant  relationship  with  firm  performance  in  Malaysia.  State-controlled 
financial  institutions  that  prioritize  socio-economic  objectives  do  not  view 
investment returns as primary objectives and the Malaysian government thus uses 
non-profit-oriented  state  ownership  as  an  instrument  to  achieve  national  socio-
economic objectives (Suto, 2003; Tam and Tan, 2007). For example, the sovereign 
wealth fund of Malaysia, the Khazanah Nasional Berhad, clearly announces that 
raising the country’s competitiveness in government-directed strategic investment 
is one of its primary investment objectives. A similar relationship is found in the 
joint  venture  between  the  Nippon  Steel  Corporation  (Japan)  and  the  Malaysian 
government that resulted in the establishment of Perwaja Steel, which was able to 
achieve  certain  non-significant  technological  advancement  (Wong,  2011). Wong 
(2011) explains that the Malaysian government was reluctant to inject the correct 
resources to enhance overall production systems because the allocation of resources 
was subject to political bargaining and because national industrial policies were 
biased to only a few business entities. Thus, socio-economic objectives tend to 
dominate  the  agenda  of  non-profit-oriented  state  ownership.  In  turn,  free-rider 
problems, bureaucracies and political preferences in appointing management are 
also prominent in non-profit-oriented state ownership because of the absence of 
the profit-making objective (Woidtke, 2002; Saleh et al., 2009; Najid and Rahman, 
2011). Corporations that receive political patronage in terms of capital financing 
and specific industry resources, however, may show positive to firm performance 
(Fraser et al., 2006; Zunaidah and Fauzias, 2008). Considering the advantages of 
political  patronage  and  deficiencies  of  non-profit-oriented  state  ownership,  we 
suggest a non-significant relationship between non-profit-oriented state ownership 
and firm performance.
Until now, we have considered state ownership in Malaysia, which differs from the 
conventional institutional ownership in advanced economies. We expect, however, 
that institutional ownership other than state ownership is an effective corporate 
governance mechanism. First, long-term institutional investors are likely to engage 
in firm monitoring to enhance the firm’s long-term value (Le et al., 2006). Second, 
by contrast, firm management is subject to pressure of the short-term institutional 
investors who may liquidate their shares when the firm’s prospects deteriorate (Le 
et al., 2006). The rationale is that the exit of short-term institutional investors would 
depress share prices in a discount. Third, institutional investors have the ability to 
monitor firm management through voice activism (Chung and Talaulicar, 2010; 
Choi et al., 2012). For example, institutional investors could build a shareholder 
coalition  to  strengthen  firm  monitoring,  criticize  management  policy  through 
the  media  or  negotiate  directly  with  firm  management.  Thus,  we  expect  that 
institutional ownership to have a positive impact on firm performance.Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2013 • vol. 31 • sv. 2 • 233-252  239
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample and data
This study uses a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the ‘Industrial Product 
Index’ in Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian Stock Exchange) from 2004-2006. We 
excluded financially distressed companies because they have incentives to engage 
in earnings management, which may be a concern for the reliability of financial 
information. Specifically, we only include firms listed on the Main Market of Bursa 
Malaysia and exclude those firms listed on the MESDAQ Market. The rationale 
is that firms listed on the MESDAQ Market are mainly small-cap stocks that are 
associated with low liquidity. In addition, Francis (2013) reported that the small-cap 
stocks listed on the MESDAQ board have difficulty gaining the investment interest 
of institutional investors, including state-controlled financial institutions. Notably, 
the year 2006 was selected as the final year in this study to avoid periods of global 
financial crisis during 2007-2009 for two reasons. First, our sample period, which is 
stable economic periods, can mitigate potential biased in market-based performance 
measure (i.e., Tobin’s Q) in this study (He and Wang, 2009). Second, prior studies 
have shown that the Malaysian government tends to provide high levels of firm’s 
specific resources to political-connected firms during financial crisis and thus alter 
the impact of state ownership on firm performance (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; 
Bliss and Gul, 2012). In total, our sample comprises 192 firms or 576 firm-year 
observations over the three-year sample period. 
Table 1: Primary investment objectives of government-controlled financial institutions 
in Malaysia
Government-controlled financial institutions Primary investment objective 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF)* Investment returns
Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP)* Investment returns
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT)* Investment returns
Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH)** Investment returns
Ministry of Finance Malaysia Socio-economic development
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB)+ Socio-economic development
Khazanah Nasional Bhd++ Socio-economic development
Notes: */**/+/++ denotes public pension fund/ Moslem pilgrimage fund/trust fund and sovereign 
wealth fund.
Source: Authors’ deliberationsAmran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state...   
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Our primary data sources are (1) Datastream and (2) annual reports published on 
Bursa Malaysia. Annual reports provide comprehensive and reliable ownership and 
corporate governance information because Bursa Malaysia’s listing requirements 
impose  a  mandatory  requirement  that  the  listed  firms  disclose  the  30  largest 
shareholders  in  their  ownership  structures.  Financial  data  and  equity  prices  are 
extracted from Datastream.
To  identify  the  heterogeneity  of  state  ownership  in  Malaysia,  we  obtained  the 
primary  investment  objective  of  state-controlled  financial  institutions  from  their 
official  websites.  For  example,  the  investment  objective  of  Permodalan  Nasional 
Bhd (PNB) is to increase the presence of Malay ownership in corporate sectors and 
Malay professionals in wealth management industries. As a result, PNB could not 
exercise  effective  firm  monitoring  and  enhance  firm  performance  (Tam  and Tan, 
2007). The primary objectives of the government-controlled financial institutions are 
presented in Table 1. Clearly, state-controlled financial institutions be classified into 
two categories. The first group consists of state-controlled financial institutions, i.e., 
Moslem pilgrimage and public pension funds, that view return on investment as their 
primary objective. The second group consists of state-controlled financial institutions, 
i.e., the Ministry of Finance, Permodalan Nasional Berhad and Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad, that do not include return on investment as a primary objective.
3.2. Model specification and estimation methods
We  built  the  regression  model  specification  based  on  the  corporate  governance 
and firm performance literature. Although our main objective is to examine the 
relationship between state ownership and firm performance, we include independent 
variables and control variables to ensure that the model specifications are correct. 
Specifically,  corporate  governance  variables,  i.e.,  ownership  concentration,  state 
ownership,  profit-oriented  state  ownership,  non-profit-oriented  state  ownership, 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership, CEO duality and board independence, 
are included in the regression models. Following previous studies (Lau and Tong, 
2008; Chen et al., 2011), we utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) with year-fixed-
effect  models  to  control  for  the  effects  of  time  and  avoid  potential  bias  in  the 
observed relationship. Two model specifications are presented in equations (1) and 
(2). In model 1, state ownership is assumed to be homogeneous across entities, as 
is commonly interpreted based on current corporate governance studies. In model 
2, we classify state ownership into profit-oriented state ownership and non-profit-
oriented state ownership, according to the objective of our study.
LnQit = β0 + β1TOP1it + β2Govit + β3Instit + β4Frgit + β5Dualit +
+ β6BODit +  Control Variables it + ɛ it 
(1)
LnQit = β0 + β1TOP1it + β2GovPit + β3GovNit + β4Instit + β5Frgit +
+ β6Dualit + β7BODit + Control Variables it + ɛ it 
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One  issue  often  raised  in  corporate  governance  studies  is  the  endogeneity  of 
ownership variables, which is commonly found in Anglo-Saxon economies (Demsetz 
and  Villalonga,  2001).  An  implication  of  endogeneity  is  that  reverse  causation 
may occur, in which increased firm performance leads to an increase in ownership 
variables.  However,  Gugler  and  Weigand  (2003)  found  that  a  high  ownership 
concentration context renders the endogeneity of ownership variables less relevant 
in empirical research. Although high concentrations of ownership in Malaysia may 
be a reason to assume the exogeneity of ownership variables, we use a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) approach to address the endogeneity issue because no available 
empirical  studies  show  that  ownership  variables  in  Malaysia  are  exogenous. The 
2SLS approach can show whether the identified causal relationship in the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) approach is consistent (or spurious). Following previous studies 
(Hermalin  and  Weisbach,  1991;  Loderer  and  Martin,  1997;  Grosfeld,  2009),  we 
utilized lagged ownership variables as instrumental variables in 2SLS.
3.3. Measure
Prior research has established the utility of Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance 
in emerging economies (Claessens et al., 2002; Young et al., 2008). Tobin’s Q is 
a  market-based  valuation  measure  of  firm  performance  because  it  is  affected 
by  the  valuation  judgments  of  investors  and  by  the  psychology  of  the  markets 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). We measured Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the market 
value of common stocks plus the book value of preferred stocks and total debts 
to  total  assets.  Following  Thomsen  et  al.  (2006),  we  performed  a  logarithmic 
transformation of Tobin’s Q to correct for a right-skewed distribution.
We adopted several corporate governance variables that are widely used in empirical 
studies  in  emerging  economies,  i.e.,  ownership  concentration,  state  ownership, 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership, CEO duality and board independence. 
Consistent with prior studies, we measured ownership concentration as the percentage 
of voting rights owned by the largest shareholder (Lefort and Urzúa, 2008; Grosfeld, 
2009).  The  rationale  is  that  the  largest  shareholder  often  becomes  a  controlling 
shareholder that has a strong influence over firm management in emerging economies. 
In addition, voting rights signify how market investors evaluate the incentive for the 
largest shareholders to mitigate agency problems in firms.
We  measured  state  ownership  as  the  percentage  of  corporate  ownership  held 
by government-controlled entities (Xu and Wang, 1999; Saleh et al., 2009; Choi 
et al., 2012). Because our primary objective is to show that state ownership is 
not homogeneous and not identical across ownership entities, we classified state 
ownership  into  profit-oriented  state  ownership  and  non-profit-oriented  state 
ownership (see Table 1). We measured profit-oriented state ownership as corporate 
ownership  held  by  government-controlled  financial  institutions  whose  primary Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state...   
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investment objective is return on investment. We classified other state ownership 
as non-profit-oriented state ownership to reflect the socio-economic dimensions of 
such firms.
Relying on prior studies, we measured institutional ownership as the percentage of 
corporate ownership held by financial institutions such as pension funds, mutual 
funds, insurance companies and banks (Lins, 2003; Le et al., 2006; Choi et al., 
2012); however, state ownership is excluded from this measurement. Although Lins 
(2003) and Choi et al. (2012) included state-controlled pension funds in institutional 
ownership, we excluded state-controlled pension funds and the Moslem pilgrimage 
fund  from  institutional  ownership  to  reflect  that  state  ownership  differs  from 
institutional ownership.
Table 2: Operationalization of variables
Variable Notation Definition
Firm performance LnQ Logarithmic transformation of Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio of the market value of common stocks plus the book 
value of preferred stocks and total debts to total assets.
Ownership 
concentration
TOP1 The percentage of voting rights owned by the largest 
shareholder.
Profit-oriented 
state ownership
GovP Corporate ownership held by government-controlled 
financial institutions whose primary investment objective 
is return on investment.
Non-profit-oriented 
state ownership
GovN Corporate ownership held by government-controlled 
financial institutions whose primary investment objective 
is not return on investment.
State ownership Gov State ownership including profit and non-profit-oriented 
state ownership.
Institutional 
ownership
Inst  Equity ownership held by financial institutions (excluding 
state ownership).
Foreign ownership Frg The percentage of ownership held by foreign multinational 
companies and financial institutions.
CEO duality Dual Dummy variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if the CEO and 
chairperson of the board of directors are same person and 
‘0’ otherwise.
Board 
independence
BOD The proportion of independent directors on the board of 
directors.
Firm size Size Total assets. 
Corporate 
investment
Inv Capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment 
scaled by total sales.
Leverage DTA The ratio of total debts to total assets.
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Choi et al. (2012) contended that foreign investors generally have a technological 
competitive advantage and may transfer firm-specific knowledge to local firms. In 
addition, foreign investors with large shareholdings have incentives to encourage local 
firms to develop technological resources. Moreover, foreign ownership may also be an 
effective corporate governance mechanism in emerging economies (Bayrakdaroglu et 
al., 2012), and we expect foreign ownership to positively influence firm performance. 
We measured foreign ownership as the percentage of shareholdings owned by foreign 
multinational companies and financial institutions (Choi et al., 2012).
We included two variables for corporate governance practices in the model: CEO 
duality and board independence. We measured CEO duality dichotomously, i.e., 
CEO duality takes the value of ‘1’ if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board of 
directors and ‘0’ otherwise (He and Wang, 2009; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; 
Bayrakdaroglu et al., 2012). Board independence was measured as the proportion 
of independent directors on the board of directors (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; van 
Essen et al., 2012).
Finally, we controlled for corporate investment, capital structure and firm size in 
our analyses. Corporate investment, measured as the total capital expenditure on 
property scaled by total sales, may positively influence firm performance (Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001). We measured firm size using total assets (Bayrakdaroglu et 
al., 2012; Choi et al., 2012). Finally, we measured the firm’s leverage ratio (capital 
structure) as the ratio of total debt to total assets (Bayrakdaroglu et al., 2012).
The operationalization of variables is summarized in Table 2.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Tables 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics and correlation matrices of the 
variables used in this study. During the sample period, the mean value of state 
ownership is 5.53%, whereas the mean values of profit-oriented state ownership 
and non-profit-oriented state ownership are 3.93% and 1.60%, respectively. These 
results suggest that the firms in our study, on average, have a higher percentage 
of profit-oriented state ownership compared to non-profit-oriented state ownership. 
Regarding control variables, the ratio of the average debt to total assets is only 
approximately 25%, which indicates low leverage levels.
The correlation matrices indicate that several governance variables are significantly 
correlated, which indicates potential multicollinearity in the regression models (see 
Table 4). For example, institutional ownership and CEO duality are significantly 
correlated with ownership concentration (p < 0.01). Thus, we performed collinearity Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state...   
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diagnostics  and  found  that  none  of  the  variance  inflation  factors  between 
independent variables reach the threshold value of 3.0, which suggest there is no 
multicollinearity in the models. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
LnQ -0.22 0.26 -1.18 1.14
TOP1 37.40 15.09 5.78 89.19
Gov 5.53 8.55 0.00 45.72
GovP 3.93 7.08 0.00 45.72
GovN 1.60 4.93 0.00 38.64
Inst 6.04 8.15 0.00 41.34
Frg 3.89 6.63 0.00 39.10
Dual 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
BOD 0.40 0.10 0.00 0.83
Inv 0.08 0.12 0.00 1.09
Size 664.93 4409.18 2.01 103155.49
DTA 0.25 0.28 0.00 3.67
No. of obs. 576      
Source: Author’s calculation
Table 4: Correlation matrices 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
LnQ 1
TOP1 0.08** 1
GovP 0.13* -0.03 1
GovN 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 1
Inst 0.08 0.13* 0.17* -0.02 1
Frg 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.20* 1
Dual -0.05 0.12* -0.09** -0.10** -0.02 -0.05 1
BOD 0.07 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.09** -0.00 -0.16* 1
Inv -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 1
Size -0.04 0.05 0.09** -0.00 0.08 0.16* -0.05 0.06 -0.03 1
DTA 0.33* -0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.08+ -0.02 -0.02 0.09 1
Notes: + p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.01
Source: Author’s calculation
Interestingly,  profit-oriented  and  non-profit-oriented  state  ownerships  are  both 
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that  state  ownership  encourages  the  separation  of  the  duties  of  the  CEO  and 
chairperson of the board of directors.
4.2. Regression results
We implemented OLS and 2SLS regression analyses to examine the consistency of 
results and endogeneity problem. 
Table 5: Regression estimates
Variable
Model 1 Model 2
Regression Coefficient (absolute t-statistics)
TOP1 0.002 (2.627)* 0.002 (2.618)* 0.002 (2.628)* 0.002 (2.624)*
Gov 0.003 (2.189)** 0.002 (1.622)+
GovP 0.003 (2.357)** 0.003 (1.993)**
GovN 0.001 (0.482) -0.000 (-0.041)
Inst 0.003 (1.997)** 0.002 (0.956) 0.002 (1.861)+ 0.001 (0.771)
Frg 0.001 (0.964) 0.002 (1.252) 0.002 (0.982) 0.002 (1.291)
Dual -0.038 (-1.666)+ -0.040 (-1.751)+ -0.039 (-1.705)+ -0.041 (1.810)+
BOD 0.208 (2.111)** 0.200 (2.032)** 0.201 (2.039)** 0.191 (1.933)+
Inv -0.016 (-0.188) -0.010 (-0.116) -0.010 (-0.121) -0.002 (-0.024)
Size -0.000 (-1.823)+ -0.000 (-1.790)+ -0.000 (-1.860)+ -0.000 (-1.830)+
DTA 0.310 (8.711)* 0.309 (8.662)* 0.309 (8.659)* 0.307 (8.595)*
Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
R2 0.399 0.152 0.401 0.154
F-statistic 9.703 9.172 8.973 8.512
No. of obs. 576 576 576 576
Notes: + p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.01; dependent variable = Log (Tobin’s Q)
Source: Author’s calculation
The estimates of the panel OLS and 2SLS analyses are shown in Table 5.
5. Results and discussion
The OLS estimation results in model 1 show that state ownership exhibits a positive 
and  statistically  significant  relationship  (p  <  0.05)  with  firm  performance.  This 
finding is consistent with many prior studies (Ramírez and Tan, 2004; Ang and Ding, 
2006; Lau and Tong, 2008; Zunaidah and Fauzias, 2008; Ghazali, 2010; Najid and 
Rahman, 2011). By contrast, the OLS results of in model 2 are in conformity with Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state...   
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our contention in this study. In other words, profit-oriented state ownership has a 
positive relationship (p < 0.05) with firm performance, whereas non-profit-oriented 
state  ownership  has  a  non-significant  relationship  with  firm  performance.  The 
2SLS estimation method also shows consistent findings on the causality of profit-
oriented and non-profit-oriented state ownership in the OLS results. Taken together, 
we found evidence of the heterogeneity of state ownership with respect to firm 
performance, thus our hypothesis is supported. We interpret this result to indicate 
that  profit-oriented  state  ownership  can  be  an  effective  corporate  governance 
mechanism that effectively monitors firm management and simultaneously offers 
a firm the capability of exploiting political patronage and accessing more resources 
and business opportunities. By contrast, non-profit-oriented state ownership is not 
an effective corporate governance mechanism for monitoring firm management. 
Although  firms  can  derive  political  patronage  from  non-profit-oriented  state 
ownership, these benefits are neutralized by the negative effect of inefficiencies 
stemming  from  free-rider  problems,  bureaucracies  and  political  interventions  in 
corporate affairs.
The OLS and 2SLS regressions offer mixed evidence on the causality of institutional 
ownership  on  firm  performance.  The  OLS  regression  indicates  that  institutional 
ownership  has  a  positive  and  significant  relationship  with  firm  performance  in 
models 1 and 2. The 2SLS estimation method, however, indicates that there is a non-
significant relationship between firm performance and institutional ownership, which 
suggest that better firm performance leads to an increase in institutional ownership 
in  the  ownership  structure.  For  this  reason,  we  interpret  these  results  to  indicate 
that institutional ownership demonstrates a relationship with firm performance, but 
not necessarily a causal relationship in Malaysian context. Our finding corroborates 
previous research that showed ownership structure is endogenous in the United States 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), but in contrast to Gugler and Weigand (2003) who 
found that ownership structure is exogenous in Germany.
We  find  evidence  that  ownership  concentration  has  a  positive  and  statistically 
significant relationship (p < 0.01) with firm performance. This result contradicts to 
prior studies that found a negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Grosfeld, 2009). Our finding can 
be explained by the fact that concentrated ownership enable the largest shareholders 
to have high levels of discretions to make better strategic decision and strengthen 
firm monitoring in technology-based industries. 
With respect to corporate governance practices, CEO duality shows a negative and 
significant relationship (p < 0.10) with firm performance, whereas board indepen-
dence demonstrates a positive and significant relationship with firm performance 
in the OLS and 2SLS estimated results presented in models 1 and 2. These results 
suggest that good corporate governance practices – in this case, separating the CEO Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state... 
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and the chairperson of the board of directors and board independence – can enhance 
firm monitoring and positively influence firm performance.
The  control  variables  yielded  few  interesting  findings.  Firm  size  produces  a 
marginal  impact  on  firm  performance,  although  the  relationship  is  significant   
(p < 0.10). Firm leverage yields a positive and statistically significant relationship 
(p  <  0.01)  with  firm  performance,  suggesting  that  debt  might  be  a  corporate 
governance mechanism that mitigates agency costs (Gul and L. Tsui, 1997). Finally, 
corporate investment does not have a relationship with firm performance.
6. Conclusions
The  results  suggest,  in  conformance  with  our  working  hypothesis,  that  there 
are  systematic  differences  among  state  ownership  with  respect  to  corporate 
governance  and  firm  performance.  We  find  that  profit-oriented  state  ownership 
exhibits a positive relationship with firm performance, whereas non-profit-oriented 
state ownership show a non-significant relationship. We interpret that corporate 
governance and firm performance differ due to heterogeneity of state ownership. 
Additionally,  we  find  that  institutional  ownership  is  endogenous,  whereas  state 
ownership variables are exogenous. We conclude that state ownership also differ 
from institutional ownership because the causation of institutional ownership on 
firm performance is spurious.
This  study  makes  the  following  contributions  to  the  literature.  First,  our  paper 
represents the first attempt to substantiate the heterogeneity of state ownership, 
which should not be neglected in corporate governance studies. By arguing that 
state ownership enables firms in emerging economies to receive political patronage 
but  that  state  ownership  differs  in  terms  of  corporate  governance  and  primary 
investment  objectives,  we  offer  an  alternative  framework  for  conceptualizing 
state  ownership  as  either  profit-oriented  or  non-profit-oriented  state  ownership. 
Second, we find empirical evidence of the endogeneity of institutional ownership 
with respect to firm performance. Thus, the endogeneity of ownership variables 
should not be overlooked, although a prior study suggests that a high ownership 
concentration context makes the endogeneity of ownership variables less relevant.
Our paper is subject to two limitations. First, the generalizability of our findings may 
be more relevant to technology-based industries because our study was based on 
a sample of 192 publicly listed manufacturing firms. The rationale is that different 
business and industry settings may show differing impacts of ownership variables. 
One natural extension of our study is to conduct comparatively analyses on different 
industries settings, e.g., technology-based and mature industries, because information 
asymmetry and technology intensity may affect ownership structure. Second, because Amran Rasli, Chin Fei Goh, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan • Demystifying the role of a state...   
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our  empirical  setting  was  based  in  Malaysia,  which  is  a  state-led  economy,  the 
generalizability of our findings on state ownership may be greater for similar types of 
emerging economies. Extending this research to emerging economies with high levels 
of government intervention remains an avenue for future research.
Our research has important implications for development policy and investment 
communities in emerging economies with high levels of government intervention. 
Our findings suggest that state ownership that prioritizes socio-economic objectives 
are adversely affected by political intervention and bureaucracies and thus leads to 
poor corporate governance. Thus, policy makers should develop new practices to 
reduce bureaucracies and political intervention to enhance corporate governance 
role  of  state  ownership.  Second,  investment  communities  should  recognize  the 
heterogeneity of state ownership with respect to corporate governance and firm 
performance. This  is  particularly  important  when  investment  communities  view 
good corporate governance to be an important criteria in their investment.
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Demistifikacija uloge državnog vlasništva u korporativnom upravljanju 
i rezultatima poslovanja tvrtki: Dokaz iz proizvodnog sektora Malezije
Amran Rasli1, Chin Fei Goh2, Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan3
Sažetak
Svrha  ovog  istraživanja  je  ispitati  ulogu  državnog  vlasništva  u  korporativnom 
upravljanju  i  rezultatima  poslovanja  tvrtki.  Primijenili  smo  običnu  regresiju 
kvadrata  i  dvofaznu  regresiju  najmanjih  kvadrata  da  bismo  analizirali  učinak 
državnog vlasništva na performansu tvrtki. Idemo dalje od postojećih istraživanja 
učinka državnog vlasništva pažljivim razmatranjem ciljeva ulaganja financijskih 
ustanova pod kontrolom države. Takvo državno vlasništvo može biti klasificirano 
kao profitno i neprofitno orijentirano državno vlasništvo u kojoj prva orijentacija 
uzima  u  obzir  povrat  na  investicije  kao  glavni  cilj  ulaganja,  dok  druga  daje 
prioritet  socioekonomskim  ciljevima.  Utvrdili  smo  da  je  profitno  orijentirano 
državno vlasništvo efektivan mehanizam za korporativno upravljanje i osigurava 
političko  pokroviteljstvo  tvrtkama  da  pristupe  svojim  specifičnim  sredstvima  i 
kreditnom financiranju. Dok neprofitno orijentirano državno vlasništvo također 
dobiva slično političko pokroviteljstvo, sklono je povezivanju s nedostacima, kao 
što su problemi “slobodnog jahača” (free-rider problems), birokratska i politička 
intervencija  u  menadžmentu  tvrtki.  Zaključujemo  da  je  državno  vlasništvo 
heterogeni subjekt u odnosu na korporativno upravljanje i rezultate poslovanja 
tvrtki. 
Ključne riječi: državno vlasništvo, institucionalno vlasništvo, rezultati poslovanja 
tvrtki, korporativno upravljanje, vlasnička struktura
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